might escalate to the nuclear level."
2 It is true that since 1998 South Asian militarized disputes have not reached the point of nuclear confrontation or fullscale conventional conºict. 3 Nonetheless, I argue that optimistic analyses of proliferation's regional security impact are mistaken. Nuclear weapons had two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nuclear weapons' ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan's dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war. 4 Although the resulting IndoPakistani crises did not lead to nuclear or full-scale conventional conºict, such fortunate outcomes were not guaranteed and did not result primarily from nuclear deterrence. Second, these crises have triggered aggressive changes in India's conventional military posture. Such developments may lead to future regional instability.
Below, I examine three phases of Indo-Pakistani relations since the nuclear tests. First, I discuss the period 1998 to 2002. I show that during these years Indo-Pakistani tensions reached levels unseen since the early 1970s, resulting in the 1999 Kargil war as well as a major militarized standoff that stretched from 2001 to 2002. An examination of this period reveals that nuclear weapons facilitated Pakistan's adoption of the low-intensity conºict strategy that triggered these confrontations, and that the crises' eventual resolution resulted primarily from nonnuclear factors such as diplomatic calculations and conventional military constraints. In the article's next section I examine the years 2002 to 2008. I argue that although Indo-Pakistani relations became more stable during this period, the improvements were modest and had little to do with nuclear weapons. Instead, they resulted mainly from changes in the international strategic environment, shifting domestic priorities, and nonnuclear security calculations. In addition, this period saw the emergence of strategic trends that could eventually undermine South Asian security. In the article's subsequent section, I discuss these developments' likely impact on future regional stability. I show that past Indo-Pakistani conºict led the Indians to begin formulat-ing a more aggressive conventional military doctrine. This could increase Indo-Pakistani security competition and result in rapid escalation in the event of an actual conºict. Thus nuclear weapons not only destabilized South Asia in the aftermath of the nuclear tests; they may damage the regional security environment in the years to come. In the article's ªnal section, I discuss the implications of my argument.
Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, 1998 to 2002
In 1998 India and Pakistan were enjoying a period of relative stability that had begun in the early 1970s. These years were not wholly tranquil, having been punctuated by periods of considerable tension. For example, a serious disagreement had arisen between the two countries during the mid-1980s over Pakistani support for a Sikh separatist movement in the Indian Punjab. 5 Also, since 1989 India and Pakistan had been at loggerheads over Pakistan's backing of a bloody insurgency in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. 6 Nonetheless, the two countries had not fought a war with each other since 1972. This was the longest period without an Indo-Pakistani war since the two countries gained independence from Great Britain in 1947. 7 Less than a year after the 1998 nuclear tests, however, India and Pakistan were embroiled in their ªrst war in twenty-eight years.
In late 1998, Pakistan Army forces, disguised as local militants, crossed the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Indian from Pakistani Kashmir and seized positions up to 12 kilometers inside Indian territory. The move threatened Indian lines of communication into northern Kashmir. After discovering the incursion in May 1999, India launched a spirited air and ground offensive to oust the intruders. The operation was characterized by intense, close-quarters combat, with Indian infantry and artillery ejecting the Pakistanis from the mountainous terrain peak by peak. Although expanding the war could have facilitated
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their task, the Indians did not cross the LoC, restricting their operations to the Indian side of the boundary. The Pakistanis ªnally withdrew in mid-July, after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif traveled to Washington and signed a U.S.-prepared agreement to restore the LoC. More than 1,000 Indian and Pakistani forces died in the Kargil ªghting. 8 What impact did nuclear weapons have on the outbreak of the Kargil conºict? The roots of the Kargil operation date back to the late 1980s, when Pakistan was beginning to acquire a nuclear capacity.
9 Pakistani leaders, long unhappy with the division of Kashmir, had launched two wars for the territory, one in 1948 and another in 1965. Although neither effort was successful, in both cases the Pakistanis managed to ªght the Indians to a stalemate. But Pakistan's 1971 defeat in the Bangladesh war, in which India severed East Pakistan from its Western wing, demonstrated that the Pakistanis could no longer confront India without risking catastrophic defeat. After 1971 Pakistan thus stopped challenging India for control of Kashmir.
By the late 1980s, however, Pakistan's strategic situation had changed, enabling it once more to attempt to undermine the Kashmiri status quo. This change resulted from several factors. First, the Kashmir insurgency threatened Indian control of the region.
10 Second, the anti-Soviet Afghan war offered a model that Pakistan could use to exploit the insurgency.
11 Third, Pakistani leaders believed that, with the end of the Cold War, the world community might be more willing to address the Kashmir issue than it had previously been.
12
Equally important as these factors, however, was Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear capability, which enabled the Pakistanis to challenge territorial boundaries in Kashmir without fearing catastrophic Indian retaliation. Pakistani leaders have openly acknowledged nuclear weapons' emboldening effects. Benazir Bhutto, who served her ªrst term as Pakistani prime minister from 1988 to 1990, stated, "I doubt that the nuclear capability was [originally] done for Kashmir-speciªc purposes." She admitted, however, that nuclear weapons quickly "came out" as an important tool in that struggle. "The Kashmiris were determined to win their freedom," and the Pakistani government realized that it could now provide extensive support for "a low-scale insurgency" in Kashmir while insulated from a full-scale Indian response. "Islamabad saw its capability as a deterrence to any future war with India," Bhutto asserted, because "a conventional war could turn nuclear." Thus even in the face of substantial Pakistani support for the Kashmir uprising, "India could not have launched a conventional war, because if it did, it would have meant suicide."
13
Leading Pakistani strategic analysts agree. According to Shireen Mazari of the Institute of Strategic Studies, with nuclear deterrence "each side knows it cannot cross a particular threshold." Thus "limited warfare in Kashmir becomes a viable option."
14 Even proliferation optimists admit that an emerging nuclear capacity enabled the Pakistanis to adopt a more activist Kashmir policy. Ganguly, for example, acknowledges that one of the "compelling reasons" that "emboldened the Pakistani military to aid the insurgency in Kashmir" in the late 1980s was that "they believed that their incipient nuclear capabilities had effectively neutralized whatever conventional military advantages India possessed." 15 The Kargil operation was originally conceived in this strategic context. Benazir Bhutto claimed that the army presented her with a Kargil-like plan in 1989 and 1996. According to Bhutto, the operation was designed to oust Indian forces from Siachen Glacier in northern Kashmir. 16 The army formulated a plan in which Pakistani and Kashmiri forces would occupy the mountain peaks overlooking the Kargil region. The logic was that "if we scrambled up high enough . . . we could force India to withdraw" by severing its supply lines to Siachen. "To dislodge us," Bhutto recalled, the Indians "would have to resort to conventional war. However, our nuclear capability [gave] the military conªdence that India cannot wage a conventional war against Pakistan." Bhutto claimed that she rejected the proposal because even if it succeeded militarily, Pakistan lacked the political and diplomatic resources to achieve broader strategic success.
17
Like these early plans, Pakistan's actual Kargil operation was designed primarily to threaten India's position in Siachen Glacier. According to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, "Kargil was fundamentally about Kashmir," where the Indians occupy Pakistani territory, "for example at Siachen." "Emotions run very high here" on this issue. "Siachen is barren wasteland, but it belongs to us," he asserted.
18 Jalil Jilani, former director-general for South Asia in Pakistan's ministry of foreign affairs, described Siachen as "perhaps the most important factor" underlying the Kargil operation. "Without Siachen," he argued, "Kargil would not have taken place."
19
Like the earlier plans, the Kargil operation was facilitated by Pakistan's nuclear capacity. Jilani explained that the nuclear tests increased Pakistani leaders' willingness to challenge India in Kashmir. In the absence of a clear Pakistani nuclear capacity, Jilani argues, "India wouldn't be restrained" in responding to such provocations. An overt Pakistani nuclear capability, however, "brought about deterrence," ensuring that there would be "no major war" between India and Pakistan. In addition, conºict between two openly nuclear states would attract international attention, encouraging outside diplomatic intervention in Kashmir. Thus, as Jilani explained, nuclear weapons played a dual role in Pakistani strategy at Kargil. They "deterred India" from all-out conventional retaliation against Pakistan. And they sent a message to the outside world regarding the seriousness of the Kashmir dispute: "War between nuclear powers is not a picnic. It's a very serious business. One little incident in Kashmir could undermine everything." Pakistani analysts also note the emboldening impact of an overt nuclear capability on Pakistan's behavior in Kashmir. Mazari argues that "open testing makes a big difference in the robustness of deterrence," further encouraging the outbreak of limited warfare. She states, "While this scenario was prevalent even when there was only a covert nuclear deterrence . . . overt nuclear capabilities . . . further accentuated this situation." 21 Proliferation optimists concede that these effects played a central role in facilitating the Kargil operation. Indeed, Ganguly and Hagerty note that "absent nuclear weapons, Pakistan probably would not have undertaken the Kargil misadventure in the ªrst place."
22
Pakistani political leaders and strategic analysts, as well as optimistic South Asian security scholars, thus recognize nuclear weapons' emboldening impact on the Pakistanis' behavior in Kashmir and at Kargil. How, then, do scholars make an optimistic case for nuclear weapons' role in the Kargil conºict? Optimists argue that although nuclear weapons facilitated Kargil's outbreak, they also deterred India from crossing the LoC during the ªghting, thereby ensuring that the dispute was resolved without resort to full-scale war. 23 Although it is true that Indian leaders' refusal to cross the Line of Control prevented escalation of the Kargil conºict, the best available evidence indicates that Indian policy was not driven primarily by a fear of Pakistani nuclear weapons.
V.P. Malik, Indian Army chief of staff during the Kargil operation, explains that the Indians avoided crossing the Line of Control mainly out of concern for world opinion: "The political leaders felt that India needed to make its case and get international support" for its position in the conºict. The Indian government believed that it could best do so by exercising restraint even in the face of clear Pakistani provocations. 24 G. Parthasarathy, India's high commis- sioner to Pakistan during the Kargil conºict, agrees. Indian leaders refrained from crossing the LoC, he explains, because they believed that doing so would yield "political gains with the world community." "We had to get the world to accept that this was Pakistan's fault," he maintains. Staying on its side of the LoC enabled India to "keep the moral high ground."
25
Despite these concerns, Indian leaders would probably have allowed the military to cross the Line of Control if doing so had proved necessary. According to Malik, the civilian leadership's "overriding political goal . . . was to eject the intruders." The government thus made clear that it would revisit its policy if India's military leaders ever felt the need to cross the LoC. This did not occur because the Indians quickly began winning at Kargil, and by early June were conªdent of victory. Malik maintains, however, that "if the tactical situation had not gone well, India would have crossed the LoC," regardless of Pakistan's nuclear capacity. Pakistan had just shown that attacks across the Line of Control need not trigger nuclear escalation. Thus the Indians believed that Kargil could also be "done the other way." 26 Former Indian National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra offers a similar analysis: "The army never pushed the government to cross the LoC." "If the army had wanted," he argues, "the government would have considered crossing." Mishra maintains that Pakistan's nuclear capacity would not have deterred the cabinet from granting the army's request, because Pakistan would have been unlikely to use nuclear weapons in that scenario. "Pakistan can be ªnished by a few bombs," Mishra argues. "Anyone with a small degree of sanity," he asserts, "would know that [nuclear war] would have disastrous consequences for Pakistan." 27 Former Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes supports these claims. According to Fernandes, India did not need to violate the Line of Control. Once the Indian counteroffensive got under way, the government was convinced that "India was in control" and "did not believe that the tactical situation was going to deteriorate." Simultaneously, the Pakistanis were suffering an international backlash, with "the United States . . . pressuring Pakistan" to undo the Kargil incursions. Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee concurs with these assessments. "There was no need to cross the LoC," he explains, "because militarily India was successful. But nothing was ruled out. If ground realities had required military operations beyond the LoC, we would have seriously considered it. We never thought atomic weapons would be used, even if we had decided to cross the LoC." 29 Tactical and diplomatic calculations, then, rather than Pakistani nuclear weapons, were primarily responsible for the Indian refusal to cross the LoC during the Kargil conºict. This does not mean that Pakistan's nuclear capacity was entirely irrelevant to India's decisionmaking. Malik concedes that Pakistani nuclear weapons led the Indians to rule out full-scale conventional war with Pakistan. As he explains, however, nuclear weapons were "not decisive" in India's refusal to violate the LoC, because the Indians did not believe that crossing the line would trigger nuclear escalation. 30 Nuclear weapons thus did have a stabilizing effect on the conduct of the Kargil conºict, but one must not exaggerate their impact. The danger of a Pakistani nuclear response would have prevented India from deliberately launching a full-scale war against Pakistan. Pakistani nuclear deterrence, however, did not prevent India from violating the Line of Control. Indian leaders' decision against crossing the LoC turned mainly on nonnuclear considerations. 31 And, as noted above, Pakistan's nuclear weapons facilitated the outbreak of the Kargil conºict in the ªrst place.
Although India and Pakistan managed to avoid a nuclear or an all-out conventional confrontation at Kargil, such an outcome was hardly a foregone conclusion. Had the Indians not prevailed from behind the LoC, they probably would have crossed the line and escalated the conºict. It is impossible to know where such actions would have led. Although the Indians would not have deliberately threatened Pakistan with catastrophic defeat, the Pakistanis could have perceived rapid Indian conventional gains as an existential threat, particularly if they endangered Pakistan's nuclear command and control capabili-
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29. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, interview by author, New Delhi, India, June 2006. 30. Malik, interview by author. 31. Although Indian leaders' accounts could be seen as self-serving, it would be equally beneªcial for them to claim that they never considered crossing the LoC during the Kargil operation. This would insulate them from the charge that they were deterred from horizontal escalation by Pakistan's nuclear capacity and would help to promote the reputation for restraint that the Indians desire. Also, Indian leaders do not completely dismiss the deterrent effects of Pakistani nuclear weapons; they admit to having ruled out full-scale war during the Kargil conºict because of Pakistan's nuclear capacity. Thus it is likely that if they had been similarly deterred from crossing the LoC, Indian leaders would be willing to acknowledge it.
ties. The Pakistanis could have responded with a large-scale conventional or even a nuclear attack. 32 Kargil's relatively restrained outcome thus belies the conºict's considerable danger.
During the 1998 to 2002 period, South Asia not only experienced its ªrst war in twenty-eight years; between December 2001 and October 2002, it also experienced the largest-ever Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. The standoff's size made its potential consequences even greater than those of the Kargil conºict. Because the crisis did not escalate to the level of combat, proliferation optimists argue that it demonstrates the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent. A close examination, however, reveals that nuclear weapons had much the same effect on the 2001-02 crisis that they did on Kargil; they helped to facilitate the confrontation and played only a limited role in resolving it.
The 2001-02 crisis occurred in two phases. The ªrst phase began on December 13, 2001, when militants attacked the Indian parliament while it was in session. No members were killed, although several security personnel died in a gun battle with the terrorists. The Indian government determined that two Pakistan-backed militant groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed, had carried out the assault. In response, India launched Operation Parakram, mobilizing 500,000 troops along the Line of Control and the international border. The Indians simultaneously demanded that Pakistan surrender twenty criminals believed to be located in Pakistan, renounce terrorism, shut down terrorist training camps in Pakistani territory, and stanch the ºow of militant inªltration into Jammu and Kashmir. If Pakistan did not comply, the Indians planned to strike terrorist training camps and seize territory in Pakistani Kashmir. Pakistan responded with large-scale deployments of its own, and soon roughly 1 million troops were facing each other across the LoC and international border. escalating the initial phase of the crisis. First, he outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Then, in a nationally televised speech on January 12, he pledged to prevent Pakistani territory from being used to foment terrorism in Kashmir. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, visiting New Delhi after stopping in Islamabad, subsequently assured Indian leaders that Musharraf was working to reduce terrorism, and was actively contemplating the extradition of non-Pakistani suspects on India's list of twenty fugitives. 34 The evident success of India's coercive diplomacy, as well as a loss of strategic surprise and the resulting fear of high casualties, led the Indians not to attack Pakistan in January 2002. 35 Indian forces, however, remained deployed along the LoC and international border.
The second phase of the 2001-02 crisis erupted on May 14, 2002, when terrorists killed thirty-two people at an Indian Army camp at Kaluchak in Jammu. 36 Outraged Indian leaders formulated a military response considerably more ambitious than the plans adopted in January. Now, rather than simply attacking across the LoC, the Indians planned to drive three strike corps from Rajasthan into Pakistan, engaging and destroying Pakistani forces and seizing territory in the Thar Desert. Before the Indians could act, however, the United States once again intervened. In early June, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage extracted a promise from President Musharraf not just to reduce militant inªltration into Indian Kashmir, but to end inªltration "permanently." 37 Armitage conveyed Musharraf's pledge to Indian ofªcials. According to Brajesh Mishara, Musharraf's promise, U.S. assurances that Musharraf would honor his commitment, and a notable decrease in terrorist inªltration into Indian Kashmir led Indian leaders to conclude that "coercive pressure was working." India ultimately did not strike Pakistan, and Indian forces began withdrawing from the international border and LoC in October. Why did India demobilize without attacking? It did so primarily because top ofªcials viewed the Parakram deployment as having been successful. No further terrorism on the scale of the parliament attack had occurred during the crisis. And the Indians had secured a Pakistani pledge, backed by U.S. promises, to prevent such violence in the future. Vajpayee explains that "America gave us the assurance that something will be done by Pakistan about cross-border terrorism. America gave us a clear assurance. That was an important factor" in the Indian decision to demobilize. 39 Fernandes maintains that India had "no reason to attack." The Indians had "stayed mobilized to make the point that another [terrorist] attack would result in an immediate response. No further attacks happened."
40 According to Mishra, Operation Parakram's "national goal was to curb terrorism emanating from Pakistan. That national goal . . . was achieved." 41 Additional reasons for India's failure to attack Pakistan in mid-2002 were the loss of the element of surprise; concern with the costs of a large-scale Indo-Pakistani conºict, including the possibility of nuclear escalation; and a desire to avoid angering the United States by attacking its key ally in the Afghan war.
42
What role did nuclear weapons play in defusing the 2001-02 crisis? Proliferation optimists claim that the confrontation's resolution was primarily the result of nuclear deterrence. 43 The truth is more complicated than the optimists suggest, however. Nuclear weapons did not play a major role in dissuading Indian leaders from attacking Pakistan during the ªrst phase of the crisis in January 2002. As noted above, Indian restraint resulted primarily from the belief that India's coercive diplomacy was succeeding against Pakistan, as well as from concern that, in the absence of strategic surprise, the costs of a conventional confrontation with Pakistan would be excessively high.
Pakistan's nuclear capability did play a role in stabilizing the second phase of the crisis, in May and June 2002. The existence of Pakistan's nuclear weapons prevented the Indian government from planning an all-out attack against Pakistan. As former Indian Army Vice Chief of Staff V.K. Sood explains, "India could sever Punjab and Sindh with its conventional forces." He goes on, however, "Pakistan would use nuclear weapons in that scenario." The Indians therefore sought "not to ªght for real estate," but rather to "draw Pakistani forces into battle . . . and inºict damage from which Pakistan would take a long time to recover." 44 Thus Pakistan's nuclear weapons did not prevent India from planning for a signiªcant attack against Pakistan proper, but they did ensure that the attack's projected scope would be limited, so as not to threaten Pakistan with catastrophic defeat. In addition, the possibility of nuclear escalation encouraged resolution of the dispute in June and the eventual demobilization of Indian forces, though it was one of several factors contributing to this outcome. As noted above, by exercising restraint the Indians also sought to avoid antagonizing the United States, and incurring high costs in a conventional conºict. And most important, Indian ofªcials believed that their coercive diplomacy had been successful, and that large-scale military pressure on Pakistan was no longer necessary. Thus nuclear weapons' role in limiting the 2001-02 crisis is mixed. In one instance nuclear weapons had little effect, and in another they did help to ameliorate the dispute, though they were not the principal stabilizing factor.
In evaluating nuclear weapons' impact on the 2001-02 crisis, however, one must not overlook their role in fomenting the standoff. The Parakram confrontation resulted from India's large-scale mobilization and associated coercive diplomacy, which in turn was a reaction to an attack on the Indian parliament and an Indian Army installation by Pakistan-backed Kashmiri terrorist groups. The parliament and Kaluchak attacks were part of a broad pattern of Pakistani low-intensity conºict, which, as explained earlier, was promoted by Pakistan's nuclear weapons capacity. 45 Regardless of any stabilizing effects that they may have had later in the 2001-02 dispute, then, nuclear weapons played a central role in instigating the crisis.
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44. V.K. Sood, interview by author, New Delhi, India, August 2004. 45. This is not to argue that Islamabad was directly involved in the parliament and Kaluchak operations. My point, rather, is that Pakistan nurtured the militant groups behind these and other anti-Indian attacks as part of its strategy of low-intensity conºict in Kashmir. This strategy, in turn, was facilitated by Pakistani nuclear weapons, which insulated Pakistan from all-out Indian retaliation and attracted international attention. Thus the 2001-02 attacks ªt a broad pattern of violence stretching back to the late 1980s and were closely linked to Pakistan's nuclear capacity.
Nuclear proliferation thus had a destabilizing effect on South Asia during the period from 1998 to 2002. By encouraging provocative Pakistani behavior and forceful Indian responses, nuclear weapons facilitated the outbreak of the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war in twenty-eight years and the largest-ever South Asian militarized standoff. And although nuclear deterrence did inject a measure of caution into Indian decisionmaking, it was not critical to stabilizing either dispute. Rather, the Kargil war and the 2001-02 crisis failed to escalate primarily as the result of India's concern with international opinion, faith in the success of its coercive diplomacy, and conventional military limitations.
In the next section, I discuss the years 2002 to 2008. This period witnessed an improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations, with a reduction in confrontations and a warming of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Some commentators attribute these developments in part to the pacifying effects of nuclear deterrence. I show, however, that security improvements during this period were modest and that nuclear weapons were not responsible for them. In fact, nuclear weapons triggered strategic developments that could destabilize the subcontinent in the future.
Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, 2002 to 2008
Since the 2001-02 crisis, South Asia has not experienced a large-scale militarized dispute; militant violence in Kashmir has declined; and India and Pakistan have begun a peace dialogue to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Some observers suggest that the pacifying effects of nuclear deterrence have facilitated these changes. 46 Two facts must be kept in mind, however, when evaluating nuclear weapons' role in the recent Indo-Pakistani rapprochement.
First, improvements in Indo-Pakistani relations, though real, have been modest. To reduce tensions in the region, the two sides have adopted a series of conªdence-building measures, such as a cross-LoC cease-ªre and the restoration of transportation and trade links between Indian and Pakistani KashInternational Security 33:2 84 mir. 47 According to the Indian government, violence in Kashmir has declined; terrorist-related incidents fell by 22 percent from 2004 to 2005, with civilian deaths falling 21 percent and security personnel deaths falling 33 percent. In 2006, terrorist incidents declined an additional 16 percent, killing 30 percent fewer civilians and 20 percent fewer security forces than during the previous year. Despite this progress, the Kashmiri security situation remains tense. One thousand six hundred sixty-seven terrorist incidents occurred in 2006, killing 540 civilians and security personnel. And estimated instances of militant inªl-tration into Indian territory from Pakistani Kashmir declined only 4 percent from 2005. 48 As a result, hundreds of thousands of Indian security forces remain stationed in Kashmir. According to a senior Indian diplomat closely involved with the Kashmir peace process, "It is difªcult to say" how much the Indo-Pakistani security environment has improved. "The Kashmir evidence is mixed," he notes. "Cross-border [militant] trafªc reports are not very positive." Meanwhile, the militants have shifted their geographical focus, and are "now coming through Bangladesh with the help of Pakistani agencies. There has been a change in tactics but not a change in attitude." 49 As Indian defense analyst Raj Chengappa puts it, "We are not in a hair-trigger environment anymore. But the situation is still serious." 50 Second, improvements in Indo-Pakistani relations have not resulted primarily from nuclear deterrence. The Pakistanis reduced their support for antiIndian militancy for two main reasons. First, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government realized that Islamic terrorism was a global problem with direct implications for the United States' own security. The Americans also decided that they needed Pakistan to serve as a leading partner in their new antiterror coalition. Thus, although the United States had previously turned a blind eye toward Pakistani support for militancy in South Asia, it was no longer willing to do so. To serve as an ally in the U.S. antiterrorism effort-thereby avoiding the United States' wrath and enjoying its ªnancial largesse-the Pakistanis were forced to reduce their support for Islamic insurgents in Kashmir, in some cases going so far as to outlaw militant groups. 51 Second, Pakistani cooperation with the United States alienated Islamic militant organizations, which branded Musharraf a traitor. These groups subsequently turned against the Pakistani government and attempted on multiple occasions to assassinate Musharraf. 52 This led the government to take further measures against the militants, as a matter of self-preservation. Pakistan's reduced support for anti-Indian militancy, then, is not the product of nuclear deterrence. Rather, this policy shift resulted primarily from changes in the international strategic environment after the September 11 terrorist attacks. 53 The Indians, for their part, have pursued improved relations with Pakistan for two principal reasons, neither of which stems from nuclear deterrence. First, India's main national priority has become continued economic growth, which Indian leaders believe is essential if the country is to reduce poverty, shed its "third-world" status, and join the ªrst rank of nations. 54 Greater prosperity, in turn, has led to rising economic aspirations among the Indian electorate. Indians increasingly expect, as Chengappa puts it, "better jobs, the American dream." Therefore the government seeks "to focus on growth and to keep the peace," rather than squander resources on continued Indo-Pakistani conºict. 55 Second, recent anti-Indian terrorism, such as the 2005 Diwali bomb-
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ings in New Delhi and the 2006 train bombings in Mumbai, has been less provocative than previous attacks, such as the parliament assault. 56 The Indians therefore have opted for restraint despite ongoing violence. If a provocation on the scale of the parliament attack were to occur, however, India might well launch a major militarized response, regardless of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. 57 Indeed, Indian leaders continue to believe, as they did during the Kargil conºict and the 2001-02 crisis, that India could engage Pakistan in large-scale conventional combat without starting a nuclear war. Like Pakistan, then, India's pursuit of improved Indo-Pakistani relations has not resulted from nuclear deterrence. Rather, it is the product primarily of shifting domestic priorities and nonnuclear strategic calculations.
Although the 2002-08 period has not seen terrorism on the scale of the parliament attack, Indian strategists, deeply affected by the Parakram experience, are preparing for the possibility of such an occurrence. As I explain below, these preparations may exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics, increasing the likelihood of conºict. Thus not only have nuclear weapons had little to do with the current Indo-Pakistani rapprochement; by facilitating past disputes, nuclear weapons have unleashed strategic developments that may destabilize South Asia well into the future.
Nuclear Weapons and Future Instability
As noted above, nuclear weapons facilitated provocative Pakistani behavior in the wake of the 1998 tests, thereby triggering major Indo-Pakistani crises such as the Kargil conºict and the 2001-02 standoff. Signiªcantly, the effect of these crises has not been limited to the past; they have had a profound effect on current Indian strategic thinking, inspiring an aggressive shift in India's conventional military posture. This could increase the likelihood of serious IndoPakistani conºict in years to come.
India has long enjoyed conventional military superiority over Pakistan. 58 This advantage has been mitigated, however, by India's peacetime deployment of offensive forces deep in the interior of the country, far from the IndoPakistani border. As a result, Indian forces were slow to mobilize against the Pakistanis, requiring several weeks before launching a large-scale offensive. 59 This gave Pakistan time to prepare its defenses and ward off any impending Indian attack. It also allowed the international community to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on India's civilian leadership, thereby preventing it from launching military action. Many Indian military leaders believe that this mobilization problem prevented India from acting decisively during the 2001-02 crisis. By the time Indian forces were prepared to move against Pakistan, the Pakistanis were able to ready their defenses, making a potential Indian attack far more costly. Most important, the Indians' slowness enabled the United States to pressure the Indian government, convincing it to abandon plans to strike Pakistan. Thus, in the words of a prominent Indian defense writer, Operation Parakram demonstrated that India's "mobilization strategy was completely ºawed." 60 In addition, the government's restraint caused rancor within the armed forces. Senior ofªcers believed that civilian leaders misused the military, ordering it to undertake a long and costly deployment and then opting for retreat, leaving the Pakistanis unpunished. As a senior U.S. defense ofªcial stationed in New Delhi puts it, Indian commanders "were frustrated. . . . They really wanted to go after Pakistan but couldn't." 61 To prevent a recurrence of Parakram's failures, the Indians began to formulate a new "Cold Start" military doctrine, which will enable India to rapidly International Security 33:2 88 launch a large-scale attack against Pakistan. The doctrine will augment the offensive capabilities of India's traditionally defensive holding formations located close to the Indo-Pakistani border. It also will eventually shift offensive forces from their current locations in the Indian hinterland to bases closer to Pakistan. Within 72 to 96 hours of a mobilization order, Cold Start would send three to ªve division-sized integrated battle groups (IBGs) consisting of armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery roughly 20-80 kilometers into Pakistan along the breadth of the Indo-Pakistani border. The IBGs would aggressively engage Pakistani forces and seize a long, shallow swath of Pakistani territory. Cold Start seeks to achieve three goals: to inºict signiªcant attrition on enemy forces; to retain Pakistani territory for use as a postconºict bargaining chip; and, by limiting the depth of Indian incursions, to avoid triggering a Pakistani strategic nuclear response. Indian military planners hope that these doctrinal changes, coupled with India's growing conventional military capabilities, 62 will result in a more nimble force that is able to prevent a repetition of Operation Parakram's shortcomings. 63 Cold Start is currently in its nascent stages. 64 The doctrine's continued development and implementation, however, will likely have two major efTen Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia 89 our nuclear capability."
67 Thus Cold Start may erode the ªrebreak between conventional and nuclear conºict on the subcontinent.
The Indians reportedly anticipate such an outcome at the tactical level and are preparing to ªght through Pakistani battleªeld nuclear strikes. 68 Indian strategists dismiss the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear response against India proper, however. Rather, they maintain that India can calibrate its attack, stopping short of Pakistan's strategic nuclear thresholds and waiting for international diplomatic intervention to end the conºict. As Gurmeet Kanwal explains, "We war-game this all the time, and we do not trip their [strategic] red lines." According to Arun Sahgal, Cold Start "will give Pakistan no option but to bring down its nuclear thresholds. But this shouldn't really worry us. We don't think Pakistan will cross the nuclear Rubicon." 69 Given the uncertainties that would be inherent in a large-scale IndoPakistani conºict, however, such a benign outcome is not guaranteed. For example, an unexpectedly rapid and extensive Indian victory, or failure to achieve a quick diplomatic resolution to the conºict, could result in a far more extreme Pakistani response than the Indians currently anticipate. Thus India's planning for a carefully controlled limited war with Pakistan could prove to be overly optimistic. As a senior U.S. defense ofªcial familiar with Cold Start worries, the Indians "think that they can ªght three or four days, and the international community will stop it. And they believe that they can ªght through a nuclear exchange. But there are unintended consequences. Calibrate a conventional war and nuclear exchange with Pakistan? It doesn't work that way." 70 Signiªcantly, a large-scale Indo-Pakistani crisis could erupt even without a deliberate decision by the Pakistani government to provoke India. The Islamist forces that the Pakistanis have nurtured in recent decades have taken on a life of their own and do not always act at Islamabad's behest. Indeed, they often behave in ways inimical to Pakistani interests, such as launching attacks on Pakistani security forces, government ofªcials, and political ªgures. 71 If these
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entities were to stage an operation similar to the 2001 parliament attack, India could hold the Pakistani government responsible, whether or not Islamabad was behind the operation. 72 And with a doctrine that would enable rapid mobilization, India's military response could be far more extensive, and more dangerous, than it was during the 2001-02 crisis.
By facilitating the outbreak of serious Indo-Pakistani crises in the past, then, nuclear weapons have inspired strategic developments that will make the outbreak and rapid escalation of regional crises more likely in the future. Thus nuclear weapons proliferation not only destabilized South Asia in the ªrst decade since the 1998 tests; proliferation is also likely to increase dangers on the subcontinent in years to come.
Conclusion
In the ªrst decade after the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests, South Asia managed to avoid a nuclear or full-scale conventional war. This does not mean, however, that nuclear proliferation has stabilized the region. In fact, nuclear weapons have played an important role in destabilizing the subcontinent. Nuclear proliferation encouraged the outbreak of the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war in twenty-eight years as well as the eruption of South Asia's largest-ever militarized standoff, and played only a minor role in these crises' resolution. It has little to do with the current thaw in Indo-Pakistani relations. And it has triggered strategic developments that could threaten the region's stability well into the future.
Although I have argued in this article against the claims of proliferation optimists, my ªndings suggest that both optimistic and pessimistic scholars largely ignore one of nuclear weapons proliferation's most pressing dangers. Proliferation optimists downplay proliferation risks by maintaining that the leaders of new nuclear states are neither irrational nor suicidal. Therefore, these scholars argue, new nuclear states will behave responsibly, avoiding overly provocative actions for fear of triggering a devastating response. 73 Pessimists, by contrast, emphasize problems such as organizational pathologies, International Security 33:2 92
